Complexity science is widely seen as a source of key theoretical capabilities that have long been lacking in the study of large-scale societal phenomena such as sociotechnical transitions. But compared with the transformative impact of complexity science in many other fields, few if any real breakthroughs have materialized. We here address the question of why societal systems remain so recalcitrant, and not only to complexity science, but to formal approaches in general. We argue that societal systems combine at least two methodologically troublesome systemic qualities -here referred to as complexity and complicatedness -and that the question of what consequences that an intermixing between these two qualities may have has not been systematically pursued. We do have powerful formal approaches for dealing with both of these qualities, but we argue that the combination between these qualities is emergent; i.e. fundamentally and irreducibly different from either quality in isolation. Noting a connection to what has long been called "wicked problems" we outline a possible new class of systems that we call "Wicked Systems" and discuss some implications of such a construct for theorizing, modeling and policy.
Introduction
A mounting scale and frequency of societal and environmental crises has increasingly brought issues such as sustainability and resilience to the fore. There is a realization that we must broaden the range of factors that affect the direction of societal evolution to include societal and environmental values, and not least that we must break out of the hegemony of the present and near future. But this has turned out to be more easily said than done. Societal change and innovation has always been a process that basically unfolds spontaneously and the dynamics of societal systems is also more and more being identified as highly complex. This clearly changes the landscape for policy (see e.g. Scoones et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2010) . On the one hand it raises serious questions about the efficacy of many of the standard policy tools, most of which are designed under entirely different assumptions about how societal systems work. But it has also opened up the promise of entirely new types of policy tools whereby the causal mechanics of social and societal dynamics is the target of policy; for example bottom-up approaches such as the management and design of social networks.
A number of different approaches have been applied, often in combination, without really managing to tame the complexity of societal systems. For the purposes of a brief exposition, we will refer to these as macroeconomic, systems theoretical and narrative-based approaches. Systems theories (or more generally "systems thinking") make mesoscopic societal organization explicit, which mainstream macroeconomic models do not, and they are thereby capable of going into details. But systems theories rely on the ability to pre-define system structure and -apart from obvious empirical challenges -such an approach still has inherent limitations if we want to understand qualitative change.
Theories of society in general, and sociotechnical transitions in particular, are therefore to a large extent based on narratives (see e.g. Geels and Schot, 2010) . Narratives are more flexible than both macroeconomic and systems theoretical tools and they are capable of seamlessly bringing together theoretical elements, stylized facts and data from many sources and in many formats (Langley, 1999; Geels, 2010; Geels and Schot, 2010) . This capability, however, comes at the obvious cost of analytical power and formal preciseness. The narrative approach has thus been criticized by multiple authors for its heuristic and descriptive nature and lack of attention to agency (Smith et al., 2005; Genus and Coles, 2008) .
The application of complexity science, a field that has proven highly capable of analyzing complex systems that have otherwise been impenetrable to formal approaches, is today increasingly suggested as a solution to these problems (see e.g. Scoones et al., 2007) . Epstein (2007) refers to the simulational approach that is central to complexity science as a "generative social science", a description that clearly brings out one of its definitional traits: the investigation of whether proposed hypotheses generate the behavior that they purport to explain. Having the ability to do this today, he argues, also charges us with doing it. This approach has come to be widely important in science generally, also in relation to the design of mathematical models, and as Bar-Yam (2003) puts it, "currently, simulations play such an important role in scientific studies that many analytic results are not believed unless they are tested by computer simulation."
Complexity science basically promises the ability to internalize emergence 1 into models of large-scale societal phenomena. The hope is that, like narrativebased approaches, it could deal with historical path-dependent change but in a more formal and analytically powerful way. It would thereby be able to address a widely recognized need for what we might call a higher theoretical level of resolution (e.g. Malerba, 2005; Geels, 2010; Holtz, 2011) . But despite what looks like an obvious match, and despite a good deal of effort in this direction, the success of complexity science has been mainly limited to rather simple social systems, such as crowds, traffic or evacuation, where the complexity of human behavior is reduced to simple rule-following. Success in the study of societal systems in their full complexity has been much more limited, and in many -if not most -branches of social science, complexity science remains rarely or at least superficially used. The motivation for this paper is to dig deeper into the question of why complexity science would be so hard to apply to societal systems in a broadly convincing way. We think complexity science is crucial for improving our basic understanding of how societies work, but that to really make a difference it must be more carefully placed into the context of other basic approaches. Through concepts like path-dependency, attractors, tipping points and chaos we have already learned basic lessons that transform deeply seated ideas about causality in society. But these are still highly general lessons that have proven hard to operationalize and they are not strongly represented in policy work. If this potential would be better realized, it could lead to far-reaching changes in how we conceive of societal systems and by that also of policy. It could lead us to challenge and reconsider fundamental conceptions about what it even means to understand, do science and control society.
Complexity science in context
By complexity science we here mean: (i) A set of fundamental concepts for dealing with non-linear dynamical systems, such as bifurcation, path-dependency and chaos etc, most of which originate from chaos theory (see e.g. Ott, 2002; Cvitanovic et al., 2005) but also from other traditions such as dissipative systems theory (Prigogine and Nicolis, 1977) and synergetics (Haken, 1977) . These fundamental mathematical concepts and models however mainly pre-date what 1 Emergence is a "venerable concept in search of a theory" (Corning, 2002) . In brief terms it has to do with how a combination of components come to generate new levels of organization and have qualitatively new properties that are not present in any of the parts in isolation, and that often do not even make sense on that level. Emergence therefore has a distinct quality of being surprising (Ronald et al., 1999) . Emergentist reasoning has been central to sociology since its inception as it was used by Durkheim (1972) for arguing that sociology ought to be a scientific discipline in its own right: its objects and their interactions were argued to not be reducible to for example psychology or biology (Sawyer, 2002) .
we might call complexity science proper, which became possible as a consequence of cheap computer technology, and is strongly based on (ii) a largely simulation-based modeling methodology that includes for example agent-based models, network models and cellular automata.
To further chart the scope of complexity science, a comparison with systems theories can be useful since the two partly share the same roots and since the the fields partly overlap and the boundaries between them are not clear. When we here speak of "systems theories" we will basically mean any theory that conceptualizes society as a hierarchical system composed of linked macroscopic components (objects and processes) that due to emergence cannot be reduced to some more fundamental level (in principle or in practice; see e.g. Bedau, 1997; Chalmers, 2006) .
Complexity science is related and in many ways similar to systems theories and the former is even often seen as an extension of the latter 2 . Their overlap risks obscuring some important differences and pointing these out will help us better define what we mean by both. Both are concerned with non-linear dynamical systems (e.g. feedback dynamics), both deal with complex systems (although, as we shall see, in two different senses) and both are concerned with emergence. But while systems theory assumes emergence -macroscopic formulations must be used because the systems cannot be reduced to some microlevel -complexity science studies emergence. So while systems theory typically deals with high-level systems of heterogeneous and functionally complementary components, complexity science typically deals with systems on lower levels of organization and it focuses strongly on mass dynamics, i.e. the dynamical interaction between large numbers of more or less similar components. Although clearly an idealization, one could say that if systems theory concerns the dynamics of macroscopic systems, complexity science concerns the emergence of macroscopic systems. Society, clearly, is as much about the latter as it is about the former, which is something that we will return to.
Complicated and Complex Systems
Complexity and complicatedness (sometimes referred to as dynamical and structural complexity; see e.g. Érdi, 2008) are two system qualities that are often juxtaposed and contrasted for the purpose of explaining what complexity science is really about; a Google search for "complex vs complicated" yields 2 From the perspective of social science it might seem as if complexity science originated in systems theory (Sawyer, 2005; Tainter, 2006; Vasileiadou and Safarzyska, 2010) . But the strongest and most formative impetus behind mainstream complexity science today is clearly the tradition that formed around the Santa Fe Institute (SFI). The SFI was the first dedicated research center for complexity science, founded in Santa Fe, New Mexico in 1984, in large part by researchers at the nearby Los Alamos National Laboratory with roots in the Manhattan Project and thereby also in the origins of scientific computing and dynamical systems theory in general; see e.g. Galison (1997) . The main root from which complexity science keeps drawing its nutrition must therefore be sought in physics, chemistry and computer science. a wealth of examples. When opposed in this way, complexity is associated with bottom-up self-organization 3 -like the behavior of a school of fish or a crowd -while complicatedness is associated with top-down organization such as in engineering 4 . By being reminded of the distinction between these two qualities we are to better understand what complexity science is about. But complexity and complicatedness are not typically separated in this way. They tend to be conflated and this leads to some confusion that easily passes below the radar. For example, when Ball (2012) speaks of society as a complex system, he means this in both senses, but the models that are covered deal with complexity only in the more narrow sense used here. When Tainter (2006 Tainter ( , 2011 speaks of societal complexity, on the other hand, he clearly means what we here refer to as "complicatedness". So would we say that societies are complex or complicated and in what senses?
On the one hand societies are undeniably complicated with their multi-level organization and bewildering array of qualitatively different and interacting entities. Systems theories for example clearly seize upon what is seen as an irreducible complicatedness of societal systems. Yet society is also often, and quite convincingly, argued to be a complex system in the bottom-up self-organization sense (e.g. Sawyer, 2005; Castellani and Hafferty, 2009; Ball, 2012) and it can certainly be argued that much of its complicated structure arises from bottomup rather than top-down processes. We clearly see no reason why systems could not be both complicated and complex at the same time, and societies would appear to be an excellent example of such a type of system.
We think that the separation between complexity and complicatedness is not just instructive in itself -we think that it represents a loose thread that can be pulled further to unravel important details about systems and how we should study them. The reason -surprisingly perhaps -is that the possibility of systematically exploring the consequences of mixing these two qualities appears not to have been explicitly pursued.
To begin understanding what this mix entails, we should first note that we are mixing a structural quality -complicatedness -with a dynamical quality -complexity -and that both of these on their own are theoretically challenging. To make matters even worse, the way in which they intermix cause these qualities to fuse into something quite unlike either quality in isolation: this is what we mean when we say that the combined quality is emergent. Complexity and complicatedness can be seen as mutually reinforcing in societies; 3 A minimal characterization of self-organization, which is a central concept in complexity science, typically includes the emergence of order without any centralized or external description of the order that emerges. In particular, it is microscopic order that through a dynamics gets extended to macroscopic scales. Although it has been developed mostly in physics, biology and for social systems, as part of a larger complexity science movement, it originally arose in neither of those fields but in psychology (Ashby, 1947) ; for more on the history of the concept of self-organization, see Shalizi (2008) .
4 An earlier systems-theory era notion of this sort of complexity is that of interactional complexity (Wimsatt, 1975) which is defined as the degree of cross-coupling in a systems.
self-organization generates, changes and maintains macro structure, and macro structure creates a multitude of arenas for self-organization.
In Figs. (1-4) we chart out system types, problems and theoretical approaches on the basis of these two well-known system qualities. The corners of the plane that is described give us four ideal system types. Systems that are neither complex nor complicated (bottom-left corner) we call "simple systems", systems that are complex but not very complicated we call "complex systems", systems that are complicated but not very complex are labeled "complicated systems" and, finally, systems that are both complicated and complex we call "wicked systems".
We choose the term "wicked systems" in recognition of a potentially deep connection (whose exact nature remains to be worked out) between this class of systems and what has been called "wicked problems". The term "wicked problems" was first coined in management research by Horst Rittel (briefly introduced by West Churchman, 1967) to characterize a class of problems that failed to fit into the molds of the formal systems theoretical models that were being applied across the board at the time with considerable confidence. Just about any large-scale societal problem can in fact be confidently put into the category of wicked problems: starvation, climate change, geopolitical conflicts, social disenfranchisement, and so on. All these are problems that escape definition and where there is a constant feeling that the efficacy of proposed solutions is called into question not only with regard to feasibility and adequacy but also with regard to the risk of creating cascades of other problems that are impossible to foresee and that may be even worse than the initial problem (see also Leach et al., 2007; Scoones et al., 2007) . Explicating the concept, Rittel and Webber (1973) conclude that the domain of wicked problems in social systems is vastit includes just about any problem short of trivialities. In Churchman's (1967) words, what we do with wicked problems is to either tame them by creating "an aura of good feeling and consensus" or by "carving off a piece of the problem and finding a rational and feasible solution to this piece"; this would appear to well describe also our generalization of "wickedness". By considering "wickedness" as a system quality, we generalize to also be able to speak of things like wicked dynamics, wicked phenomena and wicked systems.
In Fig. (1) we map three groups of formal theoretical approaches into the complexity-complicatedness plane: "mathematical theory", "systems based theories" and "complexity science". Under the rubric of "mathematical theory" we place theory and models mainly based on closed-form equations (whose scope have later been expanded with numerical methods), most importantly in this context neoclassical economic theory, such as mainstream macroeconomics approaches, which are characterized by strong assumptions about agent rationality and equilibrium that serve to make models mathematically tractable. When we refer to systems based theories we mean approaches that rely on holistic ontologies; systems theory is a central example of such approaches although the category is wider than that. What can be more generally termed "systems thinking" for example permeates science exceptionally widely today. Systems based theories break with the reductionist tradition of mathematical theory by Science Formal theorizing Figure 2: We here map different types of systems onto the complexity-complicatedness plane to roughly indicate where many or most of the problems encountered in different types of systems fall. Near the "complex" and "complicated" corners we find paradigmatic examples, such as schools of fish and technological artifacts, respectively. In the "wicked" corner we find examples, such as ecosystems and societies, that are probably straightforward to accept as partaking in both complexity and complicatedness at the same time. As we move away from the corners, the placement of the examples in the diagram becomes more contentious and it is well to point out that the idea here is not to precisely classify the systems that we have used as examples. There is considerable room for argument about where they could be placed, how they should extend across the diagram and what exceptions that may exist. It can be viewed as a strength of the diagram that it can serve as a basis for such discussions. By "simple human social" we mean social sub-systems that are relatively unstratified in their organization and that, although part of a greater societal system, may be considered to some extent in isolation and in terms of agents and environments on a single level of organization; say for instance the social interactions between children in a schoolyard. These would be examples of social systems that can be straightforwardly studied using agent-based simulations. Here we illustrate how descriptive, or agent-based, simulation represents an attempt to expand complexity science from the complex corner towards the wicked corner. This demands models that are more complicated and that will share features of what we call systems theories.
making the structure of societal systems explicit on a larger scale, deeming them to be irreducible: this has expanded the reach of formal methods from the simple corner towards the complicated corner, generally following the example of engineering. Finally, complexity science has revolutionized science on a fundamental level by covering an important flank that used to be so hard to deal with that it was nearly entirely unexplored before the 1980s. It mainly expands from mathematical theory, but also to an important extent from systems based theories (see Sec. 2) with which its shares a strong attention to feedback processes. As we illustrate in Fig. (4) , agent-based simulation, or more generally "descriptive simulation" (see Edmonds and Moss, 2005) , expands from the simple-and-complex toward the complicated-and-complex side, and in doing so it comes to share features with systems based approaches; more on this later in the paper. Societal systems would have their center of gravity near the wicked corner of the graph (see Fig. 2 ), but since formal approaches are unable to access such problems they will selectively address sub-problems that happen to fall into their domains or transplant problems from near the wicked corner to the corners of their preference (see Fig. 3 ). In the former case we obtain important but limited "snapshots" of the system in question, in the latter case we may get spurious results where strong assumptions mean that the benefit of accessing formal methods of analysis does not warrant the price in realism. In the former case we are, as we will discuss later, faced with the problem of how to combine such snapshots; see also Wimsatt (1975) .
Most complexity scientists will readily admit that their influence is concentrated to the region near the complex corner. But since complexity science defines itself more generally as dealing with systems of high complexity (falling toward the top of the complexity axis) there is no systematic recognition that something about complex systems may change qualitatively along the complicatedness axis. In summary, it is easy to identify powerful scientific approaches for dealing with all parts of the plane except for the wicked corner.
So it is true that society is a complex system, but since it is also a complicated system it is still poorly accessible to complexity science. Complicatedness is highly problematic for complexity science to internalize and the question of why can be addressed both specifically and more generally. We will start with the former and then move to the latter.
Complex systems models tend to start from simple (typically random disordered, regular or nearly empty) initial states to avoid biases that are poorly empirically founded. But wicked systems such as, for instance, cities or technical systems, never organized from such a simple starting point. They have contingent histories that stretch absurdly far back into the past -so that is not realistic either unless we are investigating very robust and general properties. Finding realistic initial states would seem like an empirical problem first and foremost, but what appears to be an overlooked point is that since complexity models (e.g. multi-agent simulations) imitate the dynamics of complex systems they are themselves also complex systems. This means that they are subject to the whole panoply of problems of non-linearity described in chaos theory.
To illustrate this problem we need mention only one: that of sensitivity to initial conditions (e.g. Ott, 2002 This means that the problem with complicated complexity models is in principle not fundamentally one of empirical exactness. No realistic levels of realism beats chaos for very long. The most paradigmatic illustration of this effect is probably that of weather forecasting; although it is indeed different in an instructive way. Initial high hopes of being able to use computers and high-fidelity data to predict weather deep into the future were quickly dashed by the discovery of chaos and the realization that no level of data exactness would suffice (see Shukla, 1998) . In the case of weather prediction the problem is not the model ontology. In fact what was surprising in that story was that prediction would be impossible in principle even if we know exactly how a system works. In the case of wicked systems few would nurture any hopes of predicting detailed future states, and we may think that we can escape the effects of chaos as long as we are content with predicting, or at least understanding, the general outlines of the future. But we must be aware of an important added complication: the rules of the system are here not only unknown, they change as a result of the dynamics itself. This is what Lane and Maxfield (2005) refer to as "ontological uncertainty" and it is also the reason why wicked systems are "worse than complex".
In a sense, complicated complexity models fail to convince because they model one wicked system using another wicked system. But the usefulness of complicated complex systems models must in the end be judged with the purpose of the study in mind. Such models may well be useful for a range of other purposes (such as for exploration, visualization, games and so on) where the concept of realism can be more liberally interpreted. in fact, better identifying the weaknesses of "wicked models" can be a starting point for also better identifying their strengths.
We will now propose one way of understanding why wicked systems are so recalcitrant, not only to complexity science but to formal modeling more in general: their organization and dynamics makes them poorly accessible to approaches that rely on what Simon (1996) called near-decomposability, which is to say just about any conceivable formal theorizing.
Wicked Systems as poorly decomposable systems
Like any formal scientific approach, complexity science and systems theories strive to isolate systems for independent study such that model properties can be fixed and formally defined. Formal approaches are desirable since they promote clarity and are amenable to powerful analytical tools based on mathematics and computation. But what really makes a system suitable for such an approach? Under what circumstances more precisely will formal methods run into trouble. Simon (1996) introduced the concept of "near-decomposability" to explain in a clear and systematic way what conditions that need apply for a system to be possible to study in a formal and controlled manner. The central observation is that if a system is to be possible to study in isolation its dynamics cannot be importantly disturbed by outside influences. In Simon's parlance we should be able to identify an internal environment where the dynamics that we study takes place, and an external environment that can be assumed to be static or at least to be variable only in highly regular ways. The boundary between the internal and external environment is the delimitation of the model and is referred to as the interface. What we study with a model is then an internal environment. Hierarchical system organization is important here: our internal environment constitutes the external environment of the objects that populate it and that we deal with only via their interfaces. We deal, therefore, with objects only in the form of interfaces, for example their interactions with other objects in the studied system. The beauty of all this is that it makes the world manageable: we declare our system as autonomous from external complexity and we hide any complexity residing on lower levels of the hierarchical organization.
We may study this internal environment during what Simon refers to as the short run: a time scale that (i) is long enough that our objects' interfaces are meaningful 5 and for important dynamics to have time to happen and (ii) short enough that our assumptions about the interface remain valid. The greater the separation of scales between the internal and the external environment, the greater will the difference in size and speed of the dynamics on these two levels be, and the more generous will the short run be; i.e. the more interesting things will have time to happen. For example, models of particle physics can gainfully be formulated in this way because those systems exhibit a clear and clean scale separation. Engineered systems, as Simon (1996) points out, are designed to fit into above description.
We can surely make such assumptions for societal systems in many important cases, and when we can we are able to bring powerful scientific approaches to bear. For the purposes of complexity science it would seem reasonable that certain subsystems, such as traffic or crowd behavior, can be argued to fit this description. The dynamics of cars and people play themselves out over much shorter time scales than that on which urban systems, roads, traffic regulation and so on, change. Such phenomena are also often ephemeral, which bounds the problem even further. For example, at night the traffic jam dissipates and leaves no traces that affect tomorrow's traffic. Similarly may be argued for certain highly abstractly conceived phenomena that depend on persistent features such as network dynamics, geography, basic resource constraints, strategic dilemmas and so on.
But what about societal phenomena more in general? For example, what about sociotechnical transitions or other wicked problems? Sociotechnical sys-tems in general are open systems, in which many and far-flung social, technical and natural processes co-exist, co-evolve and have an impact on each other on overlapping timescales and levels of organization. In many cases these problems unfold across time scales of decades or more. They involve discontinuous, qualitative change as well as cascade effects (e.g. Lane, 2011) whereby change strongly and rapidly feeds back into the conditions for further change. Such systems are, to say the least, hard to contain in a Simonean compartment with a "short run" over which transitions can be studied against the background of an unchanging external environment. The fundamental problem for complexity science in this context, and really any approach that relies on these ontological assumptions, is that on the time scales of sociotechnical transitions almost everything in society really is "changing with everything else" (Malerba, 2005) .
The generation of Wicked Systems
Understanding how systems come into being is key to understand how they work. We believe that one major type of Wicked Systems are those that act as "arenas" for multiple interaction modalities between entities, and in particular when we see competitive interaction. This tells us why societies and ecosystems are highly wicked while organisms and technological artifacts are much less so 6 . The components of organisms and artifacts interact symbiotically: they are evolved and designed, respectively, to all pull in the same direction when it comes to overall system functionality. Most of their parts even make no sense on their own (e.g. livers and computer keyboards). However, in the interaction between such entities in "arenas" such as societies and ecosystems, the predominant modes of interaction are competitive (although clearly not exclusively; see Sandén and Hillman, 2011) rather than symbiotic.
When a system is organized symbiotically there is little to disturb the emergence of neatly compartmentalized organizations; something that is desired in adaptive systems because such an organization greatly facilitates processes of design, re-combination, variation and assembly (again see Simon, 1996) . But if components interact in a plethora of ways this is no longer the case. Hierarchial organization still emerges and the system still tends to settle into at least temporarily stable self-regulating states. All sorts of cross-connections appear in the absence of any affective organizing force acting to achieve overall functionality -one part of the system internally acts to outsmart every move that other parts of the system makes, and the system is perpetually "boiling" with change.
However, neither organisms nor engineered artifacts are in reality always completely modularized into complicated systems according to the neat scheme described by Simon (1996) ; many of them incorporate substantial degrees of complexity and thereby wickedness. Wimsatt (1975) proposes that the reason for this is that while the potential for design and adaptation is maximized by a maximally decomposable architecture, functional performance is not necessarily optimized thereby. So both natural selection and design will also act to favor solutions that break up this neat structure to improve functionality.
In summary this means that we can expect to find wickedness in three types of circumstances: (i) in systems that act as arenas for complex interactions between mainly complicated systems -the main examples of this are ecosystems and societies; (ii) in systems where the efficacy of evolution or design, but not fitness/function, is maximized by modularization -examples include organisms and most engineered artifacts; (iii) cases where we are trying to top-down design a system with strong non-symbiotic bottom-up interactions -this would perhaps be the case with large bureaucratic organizations where overall functionality tends to leave much else to wish for despite a profusion of monitoring and controlling measures.
Understanding Wicked Systems
We may crudely summarize the theoretical situation as follows. Macroeconomic models drag society towards the simple corner of the plane illustrated in Figs. (1-4) , which brings it under the sway of analytical or numerical mathematical methods. This makes for supremely formal and powerful models, but it comes at the cost of moving society far from its "empirical home". Systems theoretical approaches emphasize the complicatedness of society and attempt to understand, design and steer it as a complicated but not complex system, approximately in analogy with machines and organisms. By doing this society is moved from near its native wicked corner to near the complicated corner. Although systems theories catch more of the structure and dynamics of society than macroeconomic theory does, they again bring society out of its right element in order to subject it to certain tools of analysis and design.
The call of complexity science is that society is neither simple nor complicated -it is a complex system -so we should use these new complexity methods for understanding it' (see e.g. Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Epstein, 2007; Squazzoni, 2008; Ball, 2012, among many) . In evidence that this is a promising track, successes in understanding certain simple and well delimitable social systems, that happen to fall closer to the complex corner, are brought forth. These are often viewed as "steps along the way"; a way that is envisioned as perilous but negotiable using the established methodology, either by linking the formal models or by scaling them up. But by emphasizing complexity in this way, we think that society is again moved from its wicked corner. This time toward the complex corner and, although in a different direction, again out of its right element.
If society is both complicated and complex, it would appear particularly reasonable to use a combination between approaches that successfully deal with complicated and complex systems to provide a more integrated view. For example to combine systems theoretical methods with a complexity approach. This is also in practice what many are attempting to do. Multi-agent simulation, which is basically an extension of simple complexity modeling (such as in physics and chemistry), could for instance be described as such an approach: agents, interaction modalities and environments are designed a priori in a fashion that recalls a systems approach, but they are subsequently let loose in a dynamics where emergent patterns arise, so they are clearly also complexity models. One can also imagine multi-agent and other models being combined in the form of modules in a more explicit hierarchical systems ontology along the lines proposed by Ostrom (2007) 7 . But are such simple combinations necessarily suitable for providing a fuller picture of these wicked systems? We would say that for systems as wicked as societies they are probably not, and in particular if a more in-depth understanding of the mechanisms of innovation and transitions is what we seek. One reason is, as we discussed in Sec. (3), that mechanistically linked sub-models will give us a model that is as wicked as the system that we are trying to understand. Another reason is that the formal methods that we thereby combine derive their power not from the presence, but from the lack of, complexity or complicatedness in systems. They rely on simplifications of either the structure or the dynamics of systems (or both), and for wicked systems we can frequently do neither while maintaining acceptable levels of realism. For example, engineering does not work because technological systems are complicated. It works because technology can be constructed such that it is not complex. For complexity science, even a cursory review of the literature clearly reveals that it excels specifically in dealing with systems toward the top-left corner of this plot; i.e. systems that are complex but not very complicated.
Moving forward
So what do we do about this? Can this theoretical lacuna near the wicked corner be filled -just like the area around the complex corner is being filled by complexity science? Perhaps the great challenge for the future lies precisely in understanding wicked systems. If so, we must first identify such category so that we may speak of it in a meaningful way: that systems can be both complicated and complex at the same time; that such systems are not just a simple concatenation between complicated systems and complex systems; that the system quality that results from the combination between the qualities of complicatedness and complexity is emergent.
There appears to be few options other than to aim for combined approaches, but the question of how to combine them may be deeper and more interesting than what tends to be envisioned. We will leave this task to future work and here be content with offering some thoughts.
We think that narrative 8 is the only mode of theorizing that is not obviously married to a lack of either complicatedness or complexity and that this leaves it as a natural option for a basis for combining formal approaches. While arguments to this effect are common, we think that our conceptualization can help us understand more exactly why that would be the case, which in turn would provide a better platform for moving forward.
Unlike formal approaches, narratives can at least begin to operate in "the wicked zone" (see Figs. 1-4) . For example -and probably by necessity -the dominant approaches to sociotechnical transition research today are indeed narrative based appreciative frameworks (Nelson and Winter, 1982) ; most importantly the Multi-Level Perspective (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002 Geels, , 2004 Geels and Schot, 2007) , Strategic Niche Management Schot and Geels, 2008) and Transition Management (Loorbach and Rotmans, 2006; Loorbach, 2010) . Work on "pathways to sustainability" (see e.g. Scoones et al., 2007) also call for a combination between "positivist and constructivist perspectives" to create a heuristic capable of dealing with problems that fall squarely into the wicked category. Appreciative frameworks provide thick-description discourses and imageries with the aid of which we can wrap our minds around the structure -and to some extent the dynamics -of a complex and complicated world.
A main role of the appreciative framework is also indeed one of integration. Geels (2010) argues that using appreciative frameworks allows one to address a specific topic while integrating ideas from different disciplines. Hence, the aim is to form a bridge between different perspectives, disciplines and ontologies. The framework is not regarded as an ontological description of reality, but rather as "an analytical and heuristic framework to understand the complex dynamics of socio-technical transitions" (Geels, 2002 (Geels, , p.1273 .
Unless something new and truly ground breaking is developed, the narrative appears to be irreplaceable, and its logical role is to coordinate focused applications of formal approaches. On the one hand, narratives allow us to grasp wicked systems in an intuitive way and it allows us to recount their historical development, quite possibly as a result of evolutionary cognitive adaptation to a multi-million year history of living in communities that are simultaneously complex and complicated; the so-called "Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis" (e.g. de Waal, 1982; Byrne and Whiten, 1989; Whiten and Byrne, 1997; Whiten and van Schaik, 2007) . On the other hand, in the context of modern societal systems, our abilities -while impressive on a zoological comparison -may be quite insufficient. Not least as we increasingly use computers in roles where we formerly had to rely on cognition and simpler external aids. Our ability to handle complicatedness is quite limited (for example by a limited short-term working memory; see e.g. Wynn, 2005, 2006; Read, 2008) , our ability to make strict inferences and abstractions without the use of mathematics is poor and our ability to handle complexity is next to none. So narrative theory must be complemented with formal theorizing to get past impasses where reliance on intuition will get us no further, and complexity is perhaps the steepest of those impasses.
So what we are suggesting is in one sense something that is already happening. Our contribution is to suggest a new way of conceptualizing why this is happening -to provide a road map that allows us to be more deliberate, precise and systematic. We think that the concept of wicked systems can be powerful as a condensation, systematization and in the end a tool for alignment of wide range of special arguments about the nature of a class of systems that are dispersed not only across the social sciences but also across biology and ecology; for evidence that very similar problems are tackled also there see e.g. Developmental Systems Theory (e.g. Oyama et al., 2001) , Generative Entrenchment (e.g. Wimsatt and Griesemer, 2007) and Niche Construction (e.g. Odling-Smee et al., 2003) .
Conclusion
We propose that complexity science does have a tremendous potential for deepening our understanding of how societal systems work but that applying it may be a delicate problem that involves exploring and realizing the limitations of that approach. Our starting point was the observation that despite a widespread sentiment that complexity science is important, it is still facing considerable problems. This goes perhaps especially when it comes to penetrating policy, transition and innovation research, and the question we posed was why that is the case. We identified a confusion between two qualities that are quite different, but that are both commonly referred to simply as "complexity", as an important impediment to progress. Once properly identified, the distinctiveness and orthogonality of these two qualities led us to the possibility of explicitly asking what systems that combine these qualities are like, compared to systems where either or none is dominant. This lead us to claim that society is "worse than complex": it is a wicked system and thereby qualitatively different from the types of systems that complexity science has successfully been able to deal with; see Sec. (3). Wicked systems, we propose, is a class of systems that can and ought to be studied in its own right so that approaches to understanding them can be more systematically developed.
Wicked systems combine a troublesome structural quality -complicatedness -with a just as troublesome dynamical quality -complexity -and when these qualities fuse the result is not just worse but also different. We provided one way of conceptualizing what is so methodologically troublesome with this wicked combination by using the concept of near-decomposability (Simon, 1996) ; see Sec. (4). Formal approaches rely either on low complexity, low complicatedness or low both and since wicked systems combine these qualities, formal approaches are largely prevented from operating without being confined to special cases or making strong assumptions that make models unacceptably unrealistic; see Sec. (6). This is not to say that the ways in which wicked systems are accessible formally are not important, quite to the contrary. Different formal methods allow us to systematically address different aspects of wicked systems that cannot be intuited and the addition of complexity science over the past decades means that aspects of mass dynamics and emergence can now be dealt with. What we do want to say is that there is an important "residue" that cannot be thus addressed, and that many important challenges, such as sociotechnical transitions and other wicked problems, to a large extent reside in this residue.
This residue is experienced as an inability to model certain important phenomena -for example the innovation of qualitative novelty rather than incremental change -and as a problem with integrating the snapshots provided by formal methods into a larger picture. Such a larger picture is necessary for "biting over" phenomena, such as sociotechnical transitions, that span across long temporal scales and that involve many different types of entangled processes that unfold across many levels of organization. An approach that almost suggests itself here is that of combining different formal approaches; in particular systems-based approaches -which capture the complicatedness of systems -and complexity science approaches -which deal with complexity in systems. But our analysis leads us to suggest that combinations of such approaches will not be overly successful in the core scientific role of posing and testing hypotheses. They will combine, and quite possibly amplify, the limitations of their component approaches; see Sec. (3). We want to argue that such approachesincluding for example multi-agent simulation and linked systems of modelsare more limited than the current enthusiasm that surrounds them suggests.
In closing we suggest that narrative based approaches seem to be the best choice as a framework for integrating formal models. Narrative is the only general methodology that is not strongly dependent on simplifying assumptions regarding complexity and complicatedness and that is thereby capable of operating directly in the "wicked zone". But at the same time, narratives come with their own set of problems that need to be carefully minded.
Charting out the potentials and limitations of different approaches is highly important for being able to focus research in fruitful directions and that is also the direction in which the present contribution aims to take a step. We call for a more careful charting of the methodological and ontological terrain: a more explicit, in-depth and objective argumentation about precisely why and how certain types of models would be useful and not useful.
